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Human Capital, Migration
Strategy, and Brain Drain
PETER SCHAEFFER
Division of Resource Management, West Virginia University, Morgantown, USA
ABSTRACT This research was motivated by the increasing number of foreign
students and scientists who are in the United States on temporary visas and who are
able to change their status to permanent immigrant. Origin countries, among
them industrialized western European nations, are concerned about losing many
of their best-educated and most talented citizens. This article modifies and extends
a theoretical model of optimal human capital investment before and after
migration to shed new light on the emigration/immigration of the highly skilled, and
explores some possible implications for the study of the so-called ‘brain drain’
phenomenon.
KEY WORDS: Brain drain, emigration, human capital, immigration, self-selection,
immigration strategy
Introduction
Foreign students and scientists who are in the United States on temporary
visas can try to change their status to permanent immigrant. During the
1990s, the number of such visa conversions grew significantly (National
Science Foundation 1996: 7): ‘Prior to 1991, most S&E immigrants1 in
a given year were new arrivals; only a minority were already in the
United States and had their resident status adjusted from temporary to
permanent. Data for 1991 show proportions of both new arrivals and
adjustments-of-status cases to be roughly equal, whereas in 1992, adjust-
ment-of-status cases increased to 65 percent of S&E immigration. This
trend continued in 1993, with 68.5 percent of all S&E immigration
resulting from adjustment-of-status cases.’ Additional information is
provided in another report by the National Science Foundation (1998).
Of the 656,500 doctoral scientists in the United States in 2001, 9 per cent
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were non-citizens and 14 per cent were naturalized US citizens (National
Science Foundation 2004a). In 2002, 145,112 international students on
temporary visas and 310,243 US citizens and permanent residents were
enrolled in graduate science and engineering programmes in the United
States, while 18,573 scholars on temporary visas and 13,502 US citizens and
permanent residents held post-doctoral fellowships (Thurgood, 2004; for
additional information on international students in the United States, see
Chin, 2003).
Saxenian (1999) reports a related finding in a study of the role of
immigrant engineers and scientists in Silicon Valley’s high technology
industry. She found that in 1998 a quarter of Silicon Valley’s high
technology firms were led by Chinese or Indian immigrant senior executives,
the majority of them individuals who had come to attend graduate school
in the United States and stayed (Saxenian, 1999). Of course, we do not
know whether the change in status from student to permanent immigrant
was planned ahead of time as part of a deliberate strategy, or whether it
was the result of opportunities that were unanticipated at the time of
entry as students. However, even if initially visa conversions were a lucky
break for those who obtained them, the growing number of successful
conversions is likely to attract attention and lead some highly skilled
prospective immigrants to see studies or post-doctoral work as a stepping
stone toward permanent resident status. Indirect empirical support for this
expectation comes from yet another National Science Foundation (1999)
study.
It is not altogether clear why resident status adjustments among
immigrant scientists and engineers have been increasing. It might simply
reflect the fast growth of job opportunities in the United States. The number
of jobs requiring science and engineering skills in the United States has been
growing almost 5 per cent per year, while the number of other jobs has been
increasing at a rate of only slightly above 1 per cent (National Science
Foundation 2004b).
To study this growing phenomenon, we develop a theoretical model of the
relationship between immigration and human capital. It is difficult to
distinguish empirically between human capital investment as a strategy to
gain access to a desired labour market in the destination country and human
capital investments made before and after emigration in response to local
labour market conditions in the destination country. The two human capital
investment decisions are intertwined, and it may not be possible to separate
them using data representing only successful immigrants, and data that
includes those who stay behind do not currently seem to be available. The
theoretical analysis in this article explores issues and defines questions more
precisely. In the process we gain insights that can inform later empirical
work, from data collection to its analysis.
The premise of this study is that some prospective immigrants will
strategically invest in human capital to enhance their chances of obtaining
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an immigrant visa to the destination country. Therefore, this study of the
optimal investment in human capital differs from many previous
studies. We consider not only the optimal investment in human capital
after but also before emigration. This issue is rarely considered because,
unless we assume that prospective migrants seek to enhance their chances of
obtaining legal admission through investing in human capital, there is no
compelling reason to study it. Otherwise our model follows established
paths, using the human capital approach to migration introduced by
Sjaastad (1962).
Our research is indirectly related to the literature that examines the
‘quality’ of immigrants (Borjas 1999, 1987; Borjas and Bronars 1991;
Chiswick 1999, 1986; Cohen and Zach 1997; Duignan and Gann 1997;
Duleep 2000; Lamm and Simpson 2001; Reimers 1998). However, the focus
of these studies, which is that the ‘new’ immigration may be less skilled than
earlier immigrations, differs from the focus of our research, which is not
concerned with the skills of new, compared to those of earlier, immigrants,
but with highly skilled individuals optimally investing in their human capital
to gain admission as legal permanent immigrants. Two recent articles by
Stark (2003, 2004) and one by Stark et al. (1997) start from the same premise,
but their focus is the nation’s welfare, not the optimal individual investment
decision. This article is most closely related to another contribution by
Stark et al. (1998), which studies the impact of a given probability on
human capital investment before emigration; we also look at such invest-
ment as a strategic choice to alter the probability of successful emigration
but model optimal investment before and after emigration. Our more
comprehensive approach allows more general conclusions about welfare
implications.
The examples and most of the studies cited in this article refer to
immigration to the United States, but our model should also be of interest to
other countries, particularly those that, like Australia and Canada, give
preferential treatment to highly skilled immigrants. The study is also
potentially relevant to policy makers in countries seeking to attract highly
skilled immigrants but that are less successful than desired, and to countries
that are losing highly skilled citizens to emigration (Bouoiyour et al., 2003;
Bucovetski, 2003; Carrington and Detragiache, 1999; Chu, 2004; Schwanen,
2000; Straubhaar, 2000).
The Model
Our model is patterned after a model by Djajic´ and Milbourne (1988), but
their article deals with different issues in international migration (guest
workers, not permanent immigrants), and we have also extended their
model. Chiswick’s (1978) research also shares some similarities, but he
compares individuals with different educational attainment and job
experiences, both natives and immigrants, and obtains estimates of the
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value of given human capital in the form of schooling and job experience.
His cross-sectional study cannot address how immigrants react to incentives
to add to their human capital, which is the focus of our study.
Chiswick and Miller (1995, 2001) look at language skills (see also
Gonzalez, 2000). Their approach is empirical and they do not study human
capital investment as a strategy to successful migration. In addition,
learning language skills is but one form of human capital investment. The
focus of two other related studies (Borjas, 1987; see also the comments by
Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1990, and the response by Borjas, 1990; Chiswick,
1999) is on migrant self-selection and ignores changes in human capital,
whereas we are interested in pre-migration and post-migration human
capital investments. Duleep and Regets (1999) present a model with a
structure similar to ours, but they assume fixed periods, so that they cannot
consider the issue of time spent on human capital investment, only intensity
and they do not look at optimal human capital investment decisions in
anticipation of migration. Earlier relevant models of human capital
accumulation include Ben-Porath (1967), Haley (1973), Wallace and Ihnen
(1975), and a model of the interaction between human capital accumulation
and job mobility by Schaeffer (1985). For the purposes of this paper, we chose
a version of the Djajic´ and Milbourne (1988) model as most appropriate.
The focus of our research makes it necessary to look at pre-migration and
post-migration human capital investment. Economic theory suggests that
human capital investments are optimally made early in life, usually before
entering the labour force. If we further assume that some individuals obtain
a high level of education to enhance their chances to obtain a permanent
immigrant visa to the destination country of their choice, it becomes clear
why we cannot ignore pre-migration human capital investment. Because
human capital is rarely fully transferable from one country to another and
immigrants benefit if they acquire some of their education and training in
the destination country (Borjas, 1994; Chiswick, 1978; Friedberg, 2000;
Khan, 1997; Reyes, 1997; Schoeni et al., 1996), we must also study optimal
post-migration decisions. Post-migration investing achieves more than just
adding to the immigrant’s human capital stock; it also increases the value of
the initial investment in foreign human capital by validating it. For example,
if an immigrant successfully completes an advanced degree at a respected
US university, there is no reason to question the quality of the education
received in the origin country.
Because we study prospective immigrants who are investing in human
capital before and in anticipation of emigration and then after having
emigrated, we can model their behaviour by using a backward recursive
approach. We start with the optimal human capital investment decision
after emigration, taking the migrant’s human capital and financial assets
that she brings with her as given. Following Djajic´ and Milbourne (1988) we
propose a continuous-time model of post-migration behaviours and assume
that migrants have an additive utility function that depends only on their
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consumption of commodities ci (t) and leisure, li (t), in each period, where
i=1, 2. The utility function is strictly concave and twice continuously
differentiable.
Uðc1; c2; l1; l2 j tÞ ¼
Z t
0
u1 c1ðtÞ; l1ðtÞð Þedtdtþ
Z T
t
u2 c2ðtÞ; l2ðtÞð Þedtdt ð1Þ
The subscripts i=1, 2 in ui(  ) denote the utility in period i. The immigrant
only works in the second period, which starts at time t; d is the discount
rate. The combined length of the two periods is fixed at T. An immigrant
may find it optimal to start working without any further investment into
human capital (t=0). In that case the model collapses into a one-period
model. The solution t=T is of little practical interest. We will show that
t=T can be an optimal choice only if l1=1. This outcome describes a
wealthy immigrant who chooses neither to invest in human capital nor to
work. If l151, however, then t=T cannot be an optimal solution.
We distinguish between pre-migration human capital, Hf (f stands for
‘foreign’), and human capital acquired in the destination country, H. No
other distinctions are being made. If it is optimal to invest in post-migration
human capital H at all, then the investment will be made immediately after
entry, assuming that capital markets are perfect (see Baker and Benjamin,
1997, for a model that relaxes this assumption).
The wage rate is a function ofH andHf. Thus, w ¼ w H l1ðtÞ; t jHf
  jHf ,
where H l1ðtÞ; t jHf
  ¼ R t0 1 l1ðtÞð ÞhðHfÞdt, and h(Hf) is the rate of human
capital accumulation. The rate h(Hf) depends on the stock of foreign human
capital only. (17l1(t)) measures the time devoted to human capital
accumulation. The model does not allow mixing of different forms of
human capital accumulation such as formal education first, followed by on-
the-job training. The rate of human capital accumulation is therefore either
that achieved through formal education and/or training or that obtained
through on-the-job training. We assume that dwdH > 0,
d2w
dH2
< 0 (e.g.
Duleep and Regets, 1996; Gonzalez, 2000; Park, 1999), and that Hf is
fixed. The monetary cost of acquiring human capital is given by g(Hf).
Immigrants arrive not only with a given stock of human capital, Hf, but also
with a given stock of financial assets, A. The size of initial net assets, A, is
exogenous to the model and can be positive, zero, or negative. We are now
ready to present the immigrant’s budget constraint.Z t
0
c1ðtÞertdtþ
Z T
t
c2ðtÞertdtþ
Z t
0
1 l1ðtÞð ÞgðHfÞertdt

Z T
t
1 l1ðtÞð Þw Hðl1ðtÞ; t jHf
 
ertdtA ¼ 0 ð2Þ
The first two intervals in the budget constraint represent the cost of
consumption in period 1 and period 2, respectively. The third part is the
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monetary cost of human capital investment, and the last part labour income.
All costs are expressed in present value, and r is the rate of return on capital.
In the following analysis we assume that the discount rate is equal to the rate
of return on capital (d=r). The budget constraint implies perfect credit
markets where immigrants can obtain a full loan against future earnings.
The consumption good serves as the numeraire.
The immigrant maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint. The
Lagrangean for this optimization problem is stated in equation (3). l is the
Lagrange multiplier.
Lðc1; c2; l1; l2; t jHf;A;TÞ 
Z t
0
u1 c1ðtÞ; l1ðtÞð Þedtdtþ
Z T
t
u2 c2ðtÞ; l2ðtÞð Þedtdt
 l
Z t
0
c1ðtÞedtdtþ
Z T
t
c2ðtÞedtdt

þ
Z t
0
1 l1ðtÞð ÞgðHfÞedtdt

Z T
t
1 l2ðtÞð Þw H l1ðtÞ; tÞð Þ jHf
  ð3Þ
The first-order necessary conditions for an interior optimum follow. For
notational convenience, from this point on we omit the arguments of
functions except when they are necessary to avoid misunderstandings.
@L
@c1ðtÞ ¼
du1
dc1ðtÞ e
dt  ledt ¼ 0 ð4Þ
@L
@c2ðtÞ ¼
du2
dc2ðtÞ e
dt  ledt ¼ 0 ð5Þ
@L
@l1ðtÞ ¼
@u1
@l1ðtÞ e
dt  l g 1 l2ðtÞð Þ @w
@H
@H
@l1ðtÞ
 
edt ¼ 0 ð6Þ
@L
@l2ðtÞ ¼
@u2
@l2ðtÞ e
dt  lwedt ¼ 0 ð7Þ
@L
@t
¼ u1 c1ðtÞ; l1ðtÞð Þedt  u2 c2ðtÞ; l2ðtÞð Þedt
 l c1ðtÞ  c2ðtÞ þ 1 l1ðtÞð Þgþ 1 l2ðtÞð Þw HðtÞð Þ½ edt
þ l @w
@H
@H
@t
Z T
t
1 l2ðtÞð Þedtdt ¼ 0 ð8Þ
Finally, the last condition is @L@l ¼ 0 and this ensures that the optimal
solution satisfies the budget constraint (equation (2)).
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Equations (4) and (5) yield
@u1ðc1; l1Þ
@c1ðtÞ ¼
@u2ðc2; l2Þ
@c2ðtÞ : the marginal utility of
consumption is the same in both periods. Given the optimal consumption
of leisure, this condition determines the optimal allocation of consumption
of commodities between the two periods. Since d=r and since l does not
depend on t, ci(t)=ci, i=1, 2. Similarly, equations (6) and (7) imply that
li(t)=li. However, equations (6) and (7) show that the marginal utility of
leisure is unlikely to be the same in both periods. Therefore, even if the
utility function is the same in both periods, the rate of consumption of
leisure will generally be different. Because the marginal utility with respect to
ci depends on the consumption of leisure, the rate of consumption of
commodities will also generally differ between the two periods.
From equation (5) we obtain l ¼ @u2@c2. Since consumption of leisure and
commodities does not depend on t, we rewrite equation (8).
u1 u2 ¼ @u2
@c2
"
c1 þ ð1 l1Þgþ ð1 l2Þw|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
A


c2 þ ð1 l2Þ @w
@H
@H
@t
DðtÞ

|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
B
#
ð8aÞ
DðtÞ ¼ 1edðTtÞd . A small increase in t results in additional expenditures on
first-period commodities, human capital investment, and in an opportunity
wage loss (term A). On the other hand, consumption expenditures in period
2 decrease and the wage rate increases if t is extended (term B). Thus,
equation (8a) shows that the utility gain from increasing human capital by
extending t by a small amount must be sufficient to compensate for the loss
of utility resulting from delaying the start of work. It follows from equation
(6) that ð1 l2Þ @w@H @H@ð1l1Þ > g is a necessary condition for l151: the marginal
wage gain from increasing (17l1) must exceed the marginal out-of-pocket
cost. Equation (7) shows that the second period work effort (17l2) is an
increasing function of w, as expected. First-order conditions (FOC) (6) and
(7) also show that l1 and l2 move in the same direction. It is possible that
t=T and we have a corner solution. Of course, this assumes an individual
wealthy enough to finance consumption entirely from assets. Since wealthy
immigrants are rarely a cause for concern in the destination country, we
limit our attention to the case 05t5T and l2 <1.
Under the assumption that leisure and commodities are normal goods, an
increase (decrease) in the size of assets A has a positive (negative) impact on
the consumption of leisure and of commodities. That, is
dci
dA > 0 and
dli
dA > 0,
i=1, 2. This is compatible with the conclusion of the previous paragraph
that wealthy immigrants may engage in little or no investment in H.
Inelastic Demand for Leisure
Without additional assumptions, the comparative static analysis of the
previous model yields only ambiguous results. Therefore, we assume that
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demand for leisure is inelastic and that l1 ¼ l2 ¼ l. The FOC for this more
restrictive version of the model are as follows. For convenience we will not
repeat the budget constraint (equation (2)).
@L
@c1ðtÞ ¼
du1
dc1ðtÞ e
dt  ledt ¼ 0 ð9Þ
@L
@c2ðtÞ ¼
du2
dc2ðtÞ e
dt  ledt ¼ 0 ð10Þ
@L
@t
¼ u1 c1ðtÞð Þedt  u2 c2ðtÞð Þedt
 l c1ðtÞ  c2ðtÞ þ 1 l
 
gþ 1 l Þ w HðtÞð Þ 	edt
þ l @w
@H
@H
@t
ð1 l Þ
Z T
t
edtdt ¼ 0 ð11Þ
As before we obtain du1dc1 ¼ du2dc2. This relationship allows us to express c1 as
a function of c2, that is, c1 ¼ fðc2Þ with f0 ¼ dc1dc2 ¼
d2u2=dc
2
2
d2u1=dc
2
1
> 0. Total dis-
counted utility is maximized when we maximize u1 fðc2Þð Þ
R t
0 e
dtdtþ
u2 c2ð Þ
R T
t e
dtdt, subject to the budget constraint, which is accomplished
when we maximize income. Thus, when the labour supply is inelastic the
optimization problem reduces to
MAXIMIZE
tf g
wðH jHfÞ
Z T
t
edtdt gðHfÞ
Z t
0
edtdt
 
ð12Þ
H is a function of t and is, therefore, fixed over in the second period from t
to T. The first-order necessary condition for a maximum is
gþ w ¼ @w
@H
@H
@t
DðtÞ ð13Þ
DðtÞ ¼ 1edðTtÞd , as before, and we will denote the RHS of equation (13)
by k(t).
Comparative Static Analysis
Since the comparative static results in the complex case are ambiguous we
will limit ourselves to a graphical analysis in the case of inelastic labour
supply. Recall that D’(t)50, D(T)=0, w increases with H, and H increases
with t. Therefore, the derivative of k(t) is negative and k(T )=0. The slope
of the graph of g+w is ambiguous. For small values of Hf ,
dg
dHf
<0 is
possible, so that the slope could be negative, but eventually the cost of
adding human capital H will stabilize or even increase. Since w is an
increasing function ofH and t, there will come a point when the opportunity
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cost of earnings forgone will begin to dominate and the slope of the graph of
g+w will be positive.
Figure 1(a) shows the optimal solution, Figure 1(b) shows how the
optimal solution changes if the discount rate changes, and Figure 1(c) shows
the effect of a change in T on the optimal solution. The graphs show the
expected results that a higher (lower) discount rate discourages (encourages)
investments and that a larger (lower) T increases (decreases) the value of
investing in H.
Figure 1 demonstrates that it is never optimal to choose the corner
solution t=T, assuming that human capital does not contribute directly to
utility, only indirectly through higher earnings. t=0 can be optimal if g+w
is larger than the marginal benefits of investing in H. This may apply to
highly educated immigrants, particularly those from countries with a similar
system of higher education and a common language (Baker and Benjamin,
1997), since most of their pre-migration human capital investment should be
valued similarly to H. Conversely, because H not only increases the
immigrants’ stock of human capital (e.g. expressed in ‘years of schooling’)
Figure 1. (a) Optimal choice of t. (b) Effect of an increase in discount rate on optimal
choice of t. (c) Effect of an increase in time horizon T on optimal choice of t
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but also validates their pre-migration human capital, investing in H is
particularly attractive for immigrants who are efficient at acquiring (e.g.
good knowledge of the language of the destination country) H and who
brought with them a sizeable stock of foreign human capital whose quality is
viewed with uncertainty by prospective employers in the destination country
(e.g. immigrants with degrees from ‘obscure’ foreign universities, particu-
larly those in countries with a significantly different culture and educational
system).
The second group of immigrants likely to choose t=0 as an optimal
solution is almost the exact opposite of the first and consists of those
with very little transferable human capital. Because they would have to
start almost ‘from scratch’, it would take them a long time to accumulate
a stock of human capital to qualify as highly skilled. Assuming, as we
do, that they arrive as adults and not as dependent children, they would
have considerably less time left to enjoy the benefits of the investment
than do natives and immigrants with significantly more transferable
foreign human capital. This group of immigrants is therefore less likely
to make large formal human capital investments, everything else being
held equal. The disincentive is particularly strong for investing in formal
education, but on-the-job training and work experience may serve as
(imperfect) alternatives. However, even informal human capital invest-
ment strategies depend on language skills, and the lack of such skills is
mentioned as the major reason for disadvantages suffered in the labour
market by immigrants (e.g. Borjas, 1994; Carliner, 2000; Chiswick and
Miller, 1995).
The Timing of Immigration
In our model, the timing of migration is equivalent to answering the
question of how much to invest in pre-migration human capital, assuming
that permanent emigration to country d is the ultimate objective and, if
successful, how much to invest in post-migration human capital. To this
end, we re-consider the optimal solution of equation (12) but with assets, A,
included. This gives us the total amount available for consumption, which
maximizes utility, given Hf, A and t as shown above.
Lðt;Þ ¼ wðH jHfÞ
Z T
t
edtdt gðHfÞ
Z t
0
edtdt
 
þ AðÞ ð12aÞ
where G is the time spent in the origin country before emigration. Assume
that an individual lives G0 years. Hence, T ¼ 0 . Also assume that while
living in the origin country, the individual spends all her time investing in
Hf. Hence, Hf is completely determined by G. Finally, even if the individual
cannot successfully emigrate, assume that she will make no additional
investments in Hf after time G. As we will show below, this is a reasonable
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assumption. The non-emigrant’s discounted earnings from G until T are
then given by
IðÞ ¼ wf HfðÞ
  Z T

edtdtþ AðÞ ð14Þ
The size of assets A is assumed to be negatively related to G since, by
assumption, the individual spends the time until G only investing in human
capital. During this time she does not earn an income, but must spend on
consumption and the acquisition of Hf. Thus, the derivative dA/dG50
measures the opportunity cost of acquiring Hf. Finally, assume that the
probability of being admitted into the destination country is positively
related to Hf, that is, to G. We denote this probability P(G). Our
comparative analysis of the optimal post-emigration decisions revealed
(see above) that t is positively related to T and, hence, negatively related to
G. It is more difficult to determine if t is positively or negatively related toHf
because we do not know how Hf changes g(). However, since foreign
human capital is a (imperfect) substitute for H, it is reasonable to assume
that t is negatively related to Hf.
Given these assumptions, the individual will choose G so as to maximize
total expected income after time G, given by
OðÞ  PðÞL t ;HfðÞ
 
;HfðÞ;AðÞ
 þ 1 PðÞð ÞI ;HfðÞ;AðÞ 
ð15Þ
Implicit in this formulation is the assumption L()4I() so that emigration
will be chosen if it becomes available. We are able to separate optimizing in
the period 0 to G from optimizing in the period G to T because of the
sequential nature of the decision-making, and solve the optimization
problem sequentially, going backwards. The FOC for the period 0 to G is
simple because G is the only decision variable.
dP
d
L Ið Þ þ PdL
d
þ ð1 PÞ dI
d
¼ 0 ð16Þ
Under the usual assumptions of decreasing returns, the second-order
condition for a maximum is satisfied. The first term in equation (16) shows
the expected net gain from the increased probability of successful emigration
and the sum of the second and third term is the expected net gain from
investing in additional Hf.
Implications for the Brain Drain and Migrant Self-selection
Under what conditions will an individual wishing to emigrate, and
knowing that Hf is positively related to the probability of successful
emigration, acquire more human capital before leaving than an otherwise
identical individual who plans to stay? The answer to this question is highly
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relevant to the study of the brain drain (e.g. Johnson and Regets, 1998).
From equations (15) and (16) it follows that an individual who cannot
(P(G)=0 for all G) or does not wish to emigrate will invest in Hf until
dI/dG=0. When emigration is possible, then equation (16) shows that
investment beyond dI/dG=0 may occur because the first term is positive by
assumption, which is why unsuccessful candidates for emigration will not
add to their stock of Hf after time G. Even dL/dG turning negative before
dI/dG does not preclude the possibility of investments beyond dI/dG=0, as
long as dP/dG is sufficiently large and L I. If dL/dG4dI/dG, "G, then
individuals who plan to emigrate will acquire more human capital than
otherwise identical individuals who prefer to stay, for any value of P(G).
This reveals the possibility of self-selection of immigrants that ‘looks the
same’ as that described by Borjas (1987), but is in fact different. Positive self-
selection in Borjas (1987) describes those emigrants who are among the
highly educated citizens of their native country. Our analysis shows that it is
possible that those wishing to emigrate have an incentive to become more
highly educated. Stark (2004) reaches the same conclusion.
Our analysis also shows that a policy by more advanced countries
favouring highly educated applicants for the award of permanent resident
visas (expressed by dP/dG40) may increase the cost associated with the loss
of highly skilled citizens suffered by less advanced countries. This occurs
because it strengthens the incentive of would-be emigrants to invest in Hf
beyond what would be optimal were the individual to stay. Thus, the
sending country’s loss is greater than in the absence of the policy. Equation
(16) shows that the economically most disadvantaged countries (large
difference between L and I) incur the largest relative losses, because of the
positive relationship between the difference LðÞ  IðÞ and overinvestment
in Hf. If those left behind suffer negative externalities from the loss of
educated citizens, the welfare loss to the sending country will be even
greater.
In contrast to the above argument, Stark (2004) argues that the positive
relationship between the probability of successful emigration and Hf may
result in a welfare gain in the origin country. This conclusion depends on the
assumption that there are positive externalities to education, which result in
underinvestment in human capital relative to what is socially optimal. It is
possible, however, that highly subsidized education offered in many
countries (e.g. German universities do not charge tuition), is already
working to better align private choices with social benefits.
Our analysis shows that the failed would-be emigrant suffers a welfare
loss resulting from the overinvestment in Hf, but the effect on the social
welfare of the origin country as a whole depends on the aggregate impact. It
is correct that dP/dG40 has a positive impact on general educational
attainment in the origin country, which might increase social welfare if
education yields positive externalities, as assumed by Stark (2004). How-
ever, because dP/dG40 encourages additional investments in education, it
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also increases the welfare loss associated with each successful emigrant.
Therefore, even if education yields positive externalities, the percentage of
would-be emigrants who fail to realize their ambition must be sufficiently
large to compensate for the welfare reduction resulting from the loss of
those who succeeded.
If P(G)=1 for all G, then the optimality condition is dL/dG=0. Whether
this implies a larger, the same, or a smaller investment in Hf than that of
non-migrants, depends on the net marginal benefit in the origin and
destination country, respectively, of acquiring more Hf. As shown above, if
dL/dG4dI/dG, then ‘overinvestment’ in the sense described above occurs. If
the marginal net value of adding to Hf is valued equally in both countries
(dL/dG=dI/dG), then there is no difference between emigrants and stayers.
Finally, if the marginal net value of Hf is higher in the origin than in the
destination country, the emigrants will be less skilled than identical citizens
who wish to stay. In Borjas’ (1987) analysis this would show up as negative
migrant self-selection, but is really only a reflection of the relative costs and
benefits of investing in human capital in the destination versus the origin
country. This finding suggests that to truly understand whether the new
immigration is less skilled than the old, we have to look at immigrants not at
the time of entry, but a few years later, after they had time to adjust their
human capital stock. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that we should be
able to observe systematic differences in immigrants’ initial human capital
stock by origin country. P(G)51 and dP/dG>0 weaken this relationship
because they create an incentive to invest in more Hf than would otherwise
be the case.
To more fully understand the costs and gains of investing in Hf, we
present the expanded version of equation (16).
dP
d
L Ið Þ|fflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflffl}
þ
þP @L
@|{z}

þ @L
@t
dt
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
þ @L
@Hf
dHf
d|fflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflffl}
þ
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@A
dA
d|fflffl{zfflffl}

2
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3
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@|{z}

þ @I
@Hf
dHf
d|fflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflffl}
þ
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@A
dA
d|fflffl{zfflffl}

2
6664
3
7775 ¼ 0 ð16aÞ
In each of the two terms in brackets, the negative signs signal aspects of the
marginal costs of further investments into Hf, and the positive terms the
marginal gains. The costs consist of the reduction of the length of the period
available after investing in Hf has stopped and the reduction in assets A as
more of them are used up to finance Hf. In the case of the emigrant, there is
also the reduction in t, the optimal time available to invest in H. In both
cases, staying and emigration, the gains consist of enhanced earning power.
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Finally, if P51, then an added benefit is the enhanced probability of
successful emigration.
If Hf is a close substitute of H, and if the costs of acquiring Hf are small
relative to the cost of acquiring H, then the sum
"
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@|{z}

þ @I
@Hf
dHf
d|fflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflffl}
þ
þ @I
@A
dA
d|fflffl{zfflffl}

#
in equation (16a) will stay positive longer than otherwise. In such a case,
most if not all human capital investment will take place in the origin
country, regardless of the value of P(G). To discourage citizens from
obtaining an advanced education and then leave, governments could make
students bear the costs of their education rather than subsidizing it.
Considerations other than aversion to the loss of highly educated citizens
may recommend against such a policy, however. A country could also
reduce losses by not offering advanced studies, an approach that may
make sense if there are few domestic opportunities for individuals with such
skills. For such skills, it may be more cost effective to encourage study
abroad, even if this increases the risks of ‘losing’ skilled natives to other
countries.
Human Capital of Immigrants versus that of Natives
Assume that natives and immigrants have the same life expectancy and
inherit the same assets: they are identical except for their initial location.
Natives acquire all of their human capital in country d. Immigrants acquire
a pre-migration human capital stockHf and spend time t in the host country
accumulating additional human capital H after immigrating. We assume
that pre-migration human capital is at most of equal value to human capital
acquired in country d: w HðtÞ; 0ð Þ  w 0;HfðtÞ
 
for a given t > 0. Then the
earnings forgone while investing in (post-migration) human capital are
smaller for immigrants than for natives, and the former will therefore spend
more total time (pre-migration and post-migration, combined) on acquiring
human capital than otherwise identical natives. The additional time will not
result in higher wages than those of natives, however, because it will
generally not be optimal to spend the time required to completely make up
for the lower value of Hf compared to H. This result is compatible with the
findings of Reyes (1997), and Schoeni et al. (1996).
Conclusions
Noting the significant and growing number of highly skilled permanent
immigrants to the United States who initially come as students or post-
doctoral scholars (National Science Foundation, 1996, 1998), we present a
theoretical model of the human capital investment decision before and after
emigration. The results of the analysis suggest that the two groups least
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likely to make an additional investment are almost the exact opposites of
each other. Well-educated immigrants from countries with an educational
system that is similar to, and/or respected in, the destination country, can
transfer almost all of the human capital acquired in their native country. For
them, the incentive to add to it is therefore relatively small. Immigrants with
a low stock of human capital and coming from a country with a different
educational system will also tend to make small, if any, additional human
capital investments. Unlike the members of the first group, however, it is not
because more human capital would not increase their earnings by very much
but because their opportunity cost is very high. In both cases, the net benefit
of investing in post-migration human capital is low.
A second important conclusion relates to how we regard the issue of self-
selectivity as it applies to the so-called brain drain. By analysing pre-
migration and post-migration human capital investments, we show that the
possibility of emigration may encourage individuals to invest more in Hf
than they might do otherwise. This outcome seems likely if Hf is positively
related to the probability of gaining permanent residency status in the
desired destination country, but can occur otherwise, as well. This sheds a
somewhat different light on the brain drain issue, particularly its cost to the
origin country. In the absence of positive externalities, assumed to exist by
Stark (2004), such overinvestment results in a welfare loss in the origin
country, even if the emigration attempt is not successful. IfHf has no impact
on the probability of successful emigration, individuals may still end up
investing more in Hf than otherwise identical individuals not wishing to
emigrate.
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